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REGULATING YOUR INTERNET DIET: THE
CAN SPAM ACT OF 1999
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of unsolicited commercial e-mail ("UCE"),
commonly known as "spam,"' has gorged Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs") z worldwide, creating a need for legislative
intervention. As a result of increased e-mail transmission, Internet
access has become more lethargic and web-users have become
increasingly frustrated.3  Although the Internet has quickly
become an indispensable medium of communication, it has also
fallen prey to advertisers selling everything from pornographic
web-site memberships to get-rich quick schemes Solicitors on
the Internet have found that spam is one of the easiest, least
expensive, and least regulated means of reaching a captive
audience.'
1 The true origin of the term "span" is disputed. Some claim the term is
derived from a Monty Python skit where a couple go into a restaurant and
attempt to order a meal. In the background, a group of Vikings chant and sing
the praises of spane, which drowns out all other conversation. By the end, all
conversation except the word "span is unintelligible. See Spam FAQ:
Figuring Out the Site the Spain Came From, (visited Oct. 2, 1999),
<http://www.bluemarble.netscotty/forgery.html>. Others claim the term is
derived from the canned meat "Spain" by Hormel Foods, which is believed to
have little if any nutritional value. See Donna Lampert, et al., Overview of
Internet and Regulatory Issues, 544 PLI/Pat 179, n. 114 (1998).
2 Matisse Enzer, Glossary of Internet Terms (visited Oct. 20, 1999)
<http:/www.matisse.netlfiles/glossary.htnl>.
3 Daniel P. Dern, Postage Due on Junk E-Mail-Spam Costs Internet
Millions Every Month (visited October 8, 1999) <http://www.techweb.com/sel
directlink.cgi?>.
4 Stanley A. Miller, Taking Aim at Spain E-Mail Abuse Affects Providers,
Milwaukee Journal & Sentinel, May 11, 1999, at 1.
5 See Roberta Furger, Opinion: Is AOL Losing the Fight Against Spare?,
(July 5, 1999) <http:cnn.com/TECHlcomputing/9907/05/aolspam.idg/>. (stating
that harvesting e-mail addresses is as simple as calling an ISP's member
directory or writing a program that stores all screen names as they appear in chat
rooms).
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According to conservative estimates of e-mail use, thirty percent
of approximately fourteen million e-mail messages sent daily
consist of spam.6 Rampant abuse of the Internet by bulk
commercial solicitors has led to a public outcry for action.7 This
action has taken the form of numerous propositions in the United
States Congress, none of which have succeeded in passing both
houses. The most recent and widely supported is the Can Spain Act
of 1999,8 sponsored by Representative Gary Miller.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Self-Regulatory Measures
The problem of unsolicited commercial e-mail is economically
unique.9 As opposed to traditional junk mail, the cost of sending
spare is borne by the recipient rather than the sender."0 The
solicitor, who is required to pay for printing materials as well as
the postage necessary to send it, funds traditional mass mailing.11
In contrast, junk e-mail can be sent to millions of e-mail addresses
at virtually no cost to the spammer because the recipient, the
service provider and ultimately Internet subscribers as a whole,
6 Dern, supra note 3. (approximation by America Online Inc.,) Netcom
Communications Inc., estimates that approximately 10 percent of customers'
Internet service bill or $1 million per month goes toward fighting sparn.
7 Forum for Responsible & Ethical E-Mail: Spam Primer (visited Oct. 8,
1999), <http://www.spamfree.org/spamprimer>. See also Elizabeth Weise,
"Feeling Spammed? Internet Users Get Deluged by More Junk E-mail" (Aug 5,
1999) <http://www/detnews/1999/technology> (stating that 90% of all Internet
users receive junk-email at least weekly and 96% who have e-mail addresses for
more than four years).
8 HR. 2168, 106th Cong. (1999).
9 Id.
10 Lorrie Faith Cranor and Brian A. LaMacchia, Spam!., COMMUNICATIONS
OF THEACM, Aug. 1998, Vol. 41, No. 8, at 77-78.
11 Ray Everett-Church, Testimony on Behalf of the Coalition Against
Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail before the United States Senate
Communications Subcommittee (June 17, 1998) (available at
http://www.cauce.org/testimony/senate-testimony>).
Vol. X: 175
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absorb the cost." The recipient of spare is required to pay for
additional time of Internet access in order to download, delete and
register complaints for the unwanted solicitation. 3 Second, an ISP
used for transmitting spare also bears the cost of its transmission. 4
An ISP must deal with the problem of increased bandwidth,
requiring the expense of large amounts of money on hardware to
handle the increased volume of e-mail sent and stored on a daily
basis. 5 Service providers must also hire additional administrative
staff to register and handle customer complaints.' 6 Ultimately, the
added expenses incurred by the ISPs are transferred onto the
consumers in the form of increased hourly or monthly charges.1 7
In order to reduce the transmission of spam, most suggested
measures fail to work adequately, if at all.'8 The first and most
obvious measure is to attempt to remove the junk e-mail, and
request that the sender cease further transmission. 9 While only
some unsolicited e-mail contains removal instructions to stop
future spam, it is one of the most ill advised ways to deal with the
problem." By following such instructions a junk e-mail recipient
will accomplish one of two things: 1) verify his/her e-mail address
to the spanmer, allowing for the address to be used repeatedly and
have the address added to other bulk mailing lists; or 2) the
removal will be returned as "undeliverable" because the domain
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 E-mail messages that are undeliverable to the intended address effectively
"bounce back" to the sender in order to be stored. If the sender's address is
forged, the undelivered mail is bounced back to and stored by the service
provider itself. The use of more space to store thousands of undelivered e-mail
messages daily is a major factor in increased bandwidth consumption. Hotmail
Corp.v. Van$ Money Pie, No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL
388389, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998).
16 Cranor, supra note 10, at 77.
17 See, Stanley A. Miller, supra note 4, (stating that for Netcom Online
Communications Service, a global service provider, $3 per customer per month
is applied to hardware and labor costs).
18 James A. Martin, Three Ways to Spamproof Your Inbox, (June 30, 1998),
<wysiwg: 126/http://cnn.com/TECH?... ng/9806/30/diy.spam.idg/index.htrnl>.
19 Id.
20 Id.
1999]
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name had been fraudulently obtained, making the spammer
unreachable and the removal request ineffective.2
Another proposed way to deal with UCE is through the use of
spain-blocking filters.22 Programs such as Netscape Communicator
4.0 and Microsoft Explorer,23 attempt to stop spamn before it even
reaches an intended e-mail address by allowing the e-mail user to
create and maintain a "whitelist" of names and addresses from
whom e-mail is acceptable and a "blacklist" of suspected
spammers to be blocked out.24 Yet the most common problems
with filtering are that some well-meaning and acceptable e-mail
messages go undelivered simply because they contain words that
are automatically blocked, or that well disguised spam slips
through the filter undetected. Since filtering systems are not
foolproof, they simply create an incentive for spammers to create
new ways of bypassing such systems.26
Similar to filtering systems, the creation of "opt-in" and "opt-
out" lists offers similar protection, yet have nearly identical
failures. 27 Essentially, such lists are compiled by ISPs and allow
their subscribers to request to be taken off marketing lists and
21 Id.
22 Jeff Partyka, AT&T Worldnet to Use Brightmail to Block Spam,
CNN.com (August 27, 1999) <http//cnn.comiTECHI... 9908/27/bright.mail.icg.
index.html>
23 Martin, supra note 18 at 2.
24 SpamCop: File A Spam Report, (visited Oct.8, 1999),
<http://spamcop.net> (discussing service that filters spane before reaching the
recipient's e-mail inbox and creates "white" and "black" lists to determine what
e-mail the subscriber deems acceptable).
25 Martin, supra note 8; See also 544 PLI/Pat 179, 212 (spare detection
software that identifies the mail through content rather than domain name has
been used increasingly by service providers including Bright Light, Concentric,
AT&T, EarthLink and USA.net).
26 See, CAUCE Testimony, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that once ISPs
implement a block on a particular location the spammer simply changes his
location by either obtaining throw-away internet accounts, which are usable
only once).
27 David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 45 Buff. L. Rev. 1001 (1997).
[Vol. X: 175
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require advertisers' strict compliance."8 Many programs are
created in order to head off legislation that would arguably hinder
reputable marketers' efforts to use e-mail legally and ethically.29
To date, very few junk-e-mailers comply with customer requests
by cross-referencing their opt-out lists with mailing lists and
actually delete those who have requested it.3" As can be
speculated, the creation of either type of list would need strong
enforcement mechanisms. However, the first problem is that of
incentive.31 While most agree that such lists should exist, the cost
to an ISP to promote and maintain a master list could outweigh the
benefits. Arguably, it could be more economically efficient to
employ more full-time customer service personnel to handle
complaints rather than employ the same if not more personnel to
constantly update "opt-in" and "opt-out" lists.32
In order to equalize the cost of transmission, many have
suggested the creation of payment plans for all those who receive
spae. 33 The payment systems work in one of two ways: 1) allow
internet users free e-mail, as long as they agree to have their e-mail
addresses on advertising mailing lists; 34 or 2) pay a nominal fee to
28 Sharon Machlis, Marketing Group to Offer "Opt-Out "for E-Mail, (March
1, 1999) <http://www.computerworld.com/home/news.nsf/all/990301thisone>
(marketing group, Direct Marketing Association, attempt to create system and
have all members pledge compliance with the associations guidelines regarding
Interet privacy).
29 Id.
30 See, Cranor supra note 10, at 79.
31 James W. Butler III & Andrew Flake, AOP: The Effective Control of
Direct Electronic Marketing (visited October 12, 1999)
<http:aop.org/pubs/dem.html> (stating that the success of the opting solutions
depends on whether there is sufficient motivation to keep such lists well-
maintained, well-promoted and easily accessible to consumers).
32 Martin Stone, ISP Seeks Relief From Spammer (March 19, 1999)
<http://www.computercurrents.com/newstoday/99/03/19/news 11 .html>
(Interet Direct, Ltd., was forced to over-build its additional staff strictly to deal
with customer complaints since technical solutions such as filtering, warnings,
and account terminations were having very little deterrent effect).
33 Cranor & LaMacchia supra note 10, at 81.
34 Kathleen Murphy, ISPs Offered Money To Accept Spare E-Mail, (April 6,
1998) <http://www.intemetworld.com/print/1998/04/06/news/19980406-money.
html>.
1999]
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recipients for each piece of commercial e-mail they read.35 The
first system is similar to the opt-in method discussed above, except
subscribers receive any and all e-mail advertisers send. This
system both fails to create incentives for spammers to stop mass
mailings, and invites others to begin their own sparn campaigns.
In contrast, a system of incremental payments creates a
disincentive for "small-time" spanimers to transmit blind junk
mail, the system would not affect larger solicitors as much.
Although the payment system arguably distributes the cost of spain
more evenly among all parties, many large companies would not
change simply because the system is only an increased cost of
doing business. Another problem is that payments to spar
recipients are made by use of digital systems, which must be
compatible to all servers. To date, a majority of service providers
have not created such systems, and those who have succeeded find
their programs are often incompatible with others.37
B. Federal Legislation
Since the effectiveness of self-regulatory options has been
questionable at best, many fiustrated Internet service providers
have looked to statutory law for assistance. Although the Internet
is a relatively novel phenomenon, several federal statutes have
recently been passed to regulate this unique medium. However, no
legislation has been passed to deal exclusively with commercial e-
mail. Thus a need has been created for new federal laws to be
broadly interpreted to encompass situations and problems not
originally contemplated. Specifically, ISPs have asked the
judiciary to loosely interpret federal statutes in order to
successfully sustain numerous civil suits against the most
shameless and incorrigible junk e-mailers. Presently, there is no
35 Cranor, supra note 10, at 81.
36 Id.
37 Id.
[Vol. X: 175
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federal statute that adequately tackles all aspects of the multi-
faceted problem created by unsolicited commercial e-mail.
1. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Established in 1984, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act38 has
been one of the most popular statutes cited in suits against
unsolicited e-mail advertisers. The Act prohibits any person from
intentionally accessing a computer without authorization,
knowingly transmitting information, and as a result causing
damage to the computer.39 While punishment for a first offense
under the Act is "a fine or imprisonment for not more than ten
years, or both," a second conviction for the same conduct mandates
no more than twenty years imprisonment and/or another fine.4"
Furthermore, the Act gives the Secret Service authority to initiate
investigations involving computers used by the United States
government or associated with financial institutions and authorizes
the Attorney General to prosecute such conduct.41 Although the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has been effective in dealing with
fraudulent misrepresentations and false information transmitted by
spammers, 2 the statute fails to address ISPs rights to monitor and
or filter the massive flow of non-fraudulent unsolicited commercial
e-mail and the abuses that occur.
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996
One of the most recent federal statutes is the
Telecommunications Act of 1996."3 The Act ensures that no user
of an interactive computer service shall be liable for any action
taken in good faith to restrict access or availability of material the
provider considers "lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
38 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1984).
39 Id. at (a)(4).
40 Id. at (c)(1)(A).
41 Id. at(h).
42 Hotmail Corporation v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 1998 WL 388389, at *2.
43 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
1999]
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harassing, or otherwise objectionable" regardless if it is
constitutionally protected." Further, the Act requires that service
providers notify subscribers of control options available to them,
such as filters, and other software. 45  Although it is directed at
controlling minors' access to adult websites, the statute allows
service providers great discretion to deal with other electronically
transmitted material.4' Arguably, the Act does not only deal with
material that is harmful because it is indecent, obscene or
pornographic, but also grants ISPs enough latitude to filter or
control any material that it finds "harassing or otherwise
objectionable," including junk e-mail. Since the
Telecommunications Act does not specifically deal with certain
major problems such as forged domain names and one-time
unsolicited advertisements, its applicability is severely limited to
repeat aggressive spammers who qualify as "harassing." Based on
its limited applicability, the Telecommunications Act does not
adequately serve the wide-ranging and constantly changing
problem posed by the largest and most brazen spammers.
3. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
Another statute, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
19914 ("TCPA"), commonly known as the "Junk Fax Law,"
protects telephone and facsimile recipients from unsolicited
advertisements.4" The law protects telephone solicitation recipients
by placing stringent time, place and manner restrictions on the
phone calls by telemarketers.49 First, the TCPA makes it unlawful
for telephone solicitors to use an artificial or pre-recorded voice to
deliver a message or make a solicitation without the prior written
44 Id. at (b)(2)(A).
45 Id. at (d).
46 Id. at (f)(4).
47 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1991).
48 Id.
49 See, Moser v. Federal Communications Commission, 46 F3d. 970 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that the application of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act to telemarketers was a content-neutral restriction subject only to
intermediate* scrutiny).
[Vol. X: 175
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consent of the called party.5" Based on this prohibition the Act
allows any person or entity a private right of action for a
violation."1 The action allows recovery for each violation in the
amount of the actual monetary loss or $500, whichever is greater.
Furthermore, a plaintiff can receive up to $1500 for each message
if the defendant is deemed to have acted willfully or knowingly in
violation of the law.52 Second, the TCPA allows for telephone
users to be placed on "do not call lists" upon request.53 These lists
are compiled by a national database of residential telephone
numbers at no additional cost to subscribers. Similarly, the Act
provides that if a solicitor calls a telephone number on a "do not
call" list, the recovery of $500 to $1500 per call is also allowed.54
Finally, the Act sets out technical and procedural standards, stating
that all facsimiles must identify the sender prominently on the first
page of transmission.'
Although the TCPA has been extremely efficient in dealing with
junk faxes and telemarketers, its application to unsolicited e-mail
would be tenuous at best. 6 The first difference between the two
media is the fundamental differences in their basic hardware. Fax
machines use a modem to establish a one-to-one connection
between the sender and recipient, making it impossible for any
other communication to either party while a fax is being
transmitted. 7  In contrast, e-mail is transmitted nearly
instantaneously, and can be stored by the recipient until she
decides to open it. Ultimately, junk faxes make the recipient a
captive audience, raising issues of privacy infringement, which are
not as easily applicable for junk e-mail claims.5 The second
distinction is varied costs. While maintaining an operational fax
machine with paper and toner is not extremely expensive, it is far
50 47 USCA § 227 (b)(1)(a) and (b).
51 Id. at (b)(3).
52 Id. at (b)(3)(C).
53 Id. at (c)(3).
54 Id. at (c)(5)
55 Id.
56 David E. Sorkin, supra note 27, at 1006.
57 Id.
58 Id.
1999] 183
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more costly than maintaining an e-mail account. E-mail is
transmitted, stored and read electronically, at less cost to both
sender and recipient. 9 Fundamental differences such as these
evidence the inapplicability of the TCPA to junk e-mail without
extensive alteration.
4. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
In 1986, the Electronic Communications Privacy ("ECPA") was
passed as an Amendment to Federal Wiretap Act.60 Generally the
ECPA prohibits the interception of electronic information while it
is transmitted,6" and the unauthorized interference with or access to
such information while in storage.62  Furthermore, the Act
prohibits electronic service providers from knowingly divulging to
any person or entity the contents of stored communications.63
Under all provisions of the ECPA, an award of civil damages is
available for violating any of these provisions.' However, the
problem with the ECPA lies in the limited discretion and rights
allowed to service providers in monitoring the types of e-mail
transmitted. Although the ECPA provisions allow for disclosure of
information unrelated to the substance of an electronic
transmission, ISPs are prohibited from examining both the content
of e-mail messages and their subject lines.65 Consequently, many
of the monitoring and filtering activities employed by service
providers in order to stem the tide of junk e-mail would qualify as
59 Id.
60 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986).
61 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994) "Interception" is defined as the "acquisition" of
any electronic communication "through the use of any electronic, mechanical,
or other device".
62 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994) "Access" is defined as when a person "obtains,
alters, or prevents authorized access to" and electronic communication while it
is in electronic storage.
63 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994).
64 18 U.S.C. § § 2520, 2707 (1994).
65 Steven Miller, Washington's Spain Killing Statute: Does It Slaughter
Privacy in the Process?, 47 WASH. L. REV. 453,462 (1999).
184 [Vol. X: 175
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"interception" violations of the ECPA.66 Although ISPs have
unrestricted access to the contents of electronic communications
after they are stored, this does not solve the constant problem of
increased bandwidth. If a junk e-mail message is both transmitted
and stored by an ISP, the spammer's goal has effectively been
accomplished unhindered. Therefore, any access to or monitoring
of junk e-mail by ISPs after transmission does not create an
incentive for junk e-mailers to stop forging e-mails' points of
origin or transmitting e-mail with false or misleading information
on subject lines.
C. State Legislation
To date fourteen states have enacted legislation to deal
specifically with the problem of unsolicited commercial e-mail.67
One of the first to formally enact such a law was Nevada, which
banned unsolicited commercial e-mail unless the message is
"clearly and conspicuously identified" as an advertisement, and
required all such messages to include "opt-out" instructions.68
Other states such as Virginia impose stricter penalties and larger
fines for similar conduct.69 The Virginia statute provides for
criminal penalties against spammers, in addition to insulating
service providers by their subscribers for the junk e-mail they
66 Id. at 472 Although a "protection of interests" exception to the
interception exists, ISPs would most likely fail in qualifying for the exception.
The use of hybrid and/or proactive approaches to monitoring electronic
communications would not meet the requirements of the exceptions allowed by
the interception provision because less intrusive approaches to protecting ISPs
property interests exist.
67 Unsolicited E-Mail Statutes, (visited Sept. 23, 1999)
<http.jmls.edu/cyber/statutes/email/state>.
68 41 N.R.S. § 7 (1997) (as amended by Senate Bill No.13) (the original bill
prohibited UCE absent a preexisting business or personal relationship, and civil
damages in the amount of $10 or actual damages for each violation).
69 See Zeleny Jeff, Legislators Target Unsolicited E-mail, THE DES MOrNES
REGISTER, Feb. 19, 1999, at 6 (Proposed Iowa statute allows for a fine of $250
to $5000 per violation); Illinois House Bill No. 2616, 91st Gen. Ass. (1999)
(allowing for private right of action and recovery of $500 per violation).
1999]
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receive from mass commercial e-mail.7" Based on its provisions,
forged sender addresses are classified as a misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine of up to $500 per message.71 However, if the
spammer's transmission is considered "malicious" and/or causes
more than $2500 in damage, the conduct is chargeable as a
felony.72
In the Washington statute, not all unsolicited commercial e-mail
is prohibited, only communications that either misrepresent a
sender's e-mail address or contain false information on the subject
line.73 The statute also allows ISPs and spam recipients to bring a
civil suit to recover their damages,74 and gives the Attorney
General the power to sue based on provisions of the Electronic
Consumer Protection Act.75
In California, the state legislature has passed several statutes to
deal with the spam problem, including an amendment to the
California Business and Professional Code. This amendment is the
predecessor of the Federal Can Spam Act, both sponsored by
Representative Gary Miller.76 First, the California statute defers to
service providers by prohibiting the use of equipment owned by
ISPs that is in violation of their respective policies regarding the
initiation of unsolicited commercial e-mail.77 Second, the statute
provides for "a civil action to recover actual monetary loss suffered
by a service provider, or fifty dollars ($50) for each violation,...
70 VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4 (1998).
71 VA CODEANN. § 18.2-152.4 (C)
72 Id.
73 WASH. REV. CODE §19.190.005 - 050 (1998).
74 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.040. For each violation service providers are
allowed damages of $1000, and junk e-mail recipients receive actual damages or
$500, whichever is greater,.
75 WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.080.
76 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §17538.4. Among other provisions, the
California statute mandates any business conducting advertising using e-mail to
include a valid return e-mail address that the recipient can use to notify the
sender not to transmit any further solicitations. Also, unsolicited advertising
material transmitted via e-mail is required to include "ADV:" in the first four
characters in the subject line, and "ADV:ADLT" if the solicitation is directed at
adult recipients.
77 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17538.45 (b).
186 [Vol. X: 175
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up to a maximum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) per
day. 7  However, by bringing such an action, a service provider is
required to prove that the defendant spammer had notice of the
ISP's spam policy and defendant's transmission used plaintiffs
79
equipment located in the state.
D. Litigation
Since less intrusive means of curbing spam have proven
unsuccessful, many Internet Service Providers have resorted to
common law litigation in order to enjoin the practice. In Cyber
Promotions Inc. v. America Online Inc.,8 1 the district court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania consolidated cross-complaints
between a private online company and an Internet Service Provider
regarding the right to freely disseminate spain to ISP subscribers."1
In this case, Cyber Promotions sought injunctive relief and
damages based on America Online's (AOL's) "e-mail bombs,8 2
AOL's prevention of its members from receiving Cyber
Promotions e-mail messages, and declaratory relief stating that
Cyber Promotions had a First Amendment right to send
advertisements to AOL's subscribers.8 3 The court held the actions
taken by a private online company to eliminate unsolicited e-mail
sent to its subscribers did not constitute state action for the
purposes of the First Amendment. 4 Furthermore, the court found
that a right to freely distribute unsolicited commercial e-mail is not
78 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45 (f).
79 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45 (f)(3)(A)(i-ii).
80 Cyber Promotions Inc. v. America Online Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D.
Pa. 1996).
81 Id. at 456.
82 An "e-mail bomb" occurs when many e-mails are collected and sent all at
once to an address. In this case, AOL gathered all the undelivered unsolicited e-
mail sent by Cyber Promotions, altered the return path, and sent a bulk e-mail
back to Cyber Promotions. This bulk mailing disabled Cyber Promotions' ISPs,
many of whom terminated their contracts with Cyber Promotions. Id. at 437.
83 CyberPromotions, 948 F. Supp. at 438.
84 Id.
1999]
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guaranteed by the First Amendment, especially when other forms
of solicitation are available."
Similarly in CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions,86 an Ohio district
court determined that Cyber Promotions' unsolicited bulk
advertising was sufficiently reprehensible to be enjoined. 7 In this
case, CompuServe relied on the property concept of trespass to
chattels in order to protect its computer systems from being used to
send spam by the infamous Sanford "Spamford" Wallace.88
CompuServe, an ISP, had been inundated by unsolicited e-mail
sent by the defendants, as well as by customer complaints about
this spam."9 CompuServe claimed the defendants, without consent,
used its proprietary computer systems and that such use led to
"diminution of its quality, condition and value."9  The district
court agreed and held that Cyber Promotions actions were an
actionable trespass.9" Ultimately, the court granted CompuServe
an injunction against Cyber Promotions, restraining defendant
from "sending any unsolicited advertisements to any electronic
mail address maintained by the plaintiff."92 Although emphasizing
a preference for the use of self-help measures such as those
suggested above, the court found that an injunction was the only
adequate remedy sufficient to protect CompuServe's nationwide
computer network. 93
85 Id.
86 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
87 Id. at 1016.
88 Id. at 1017.
89 Id. at 1019.
90 Id. at 1021, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §218 (1965)
Trespass to a chattel subjects the possessor of the chattel to liability if, but only
if: (a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or (b) the chattel is impaired as to
its condition, quality, or value, or (c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the
chattel for a substantial time, or (d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor or
harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally
protected interest.
91 Id. at 1024.
92 Id. at 1028.
93 Id. at 1017.
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Similar to CompuServe, the plaintiff in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$
Money Pie, Inc.94 sought relief to enjoin Van$ Money Pie from
sending bulk commercial e-mail messages under falsified e-mail
addresses owned by the plaintiff.9" Hotmail based its cause of
action not only on common law trespass to chattels, but also
violation of the Computer Fraud Abuse Act,96 unfair competition,
breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, and trademark
dilution.97 In this case, Van$ Money Pie obtained consent to create
Hotmail accounts limited to Terms of Service which included a
prohibition against spamming.98 The defendant, however used the
Hotmail domain name to solicit plaintiffs subscribers, and falsely
designated the spam's point of origin.99 The forged sender
addresses caused all customer complaints regarding the spain to
"bounce back'"' to Hotmail. 101
The district court took a similar position to the court in
CompuServe, and found defendant's actions violative of the
common law trespass to chattels. 2 This trespass was caused by
transmitting misdirected spame without authorization, filling up
plaintiffs computer storage space, and threatening to damage
Hotmail's ability to service its legitimate customers.10 3 The court
also found that the defendant violated the Lanham Act"°4 by
causing "consumer confusion or mistake as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval" of the defendant's junk e-mail, through
the falsified use of Hotmail's mark.'05
Contrary to the plaintiffs' attempts at equitable relief in
CompuServe and Hotmail, the plaintiff in America Online Inc. v.
94 1998 WL 388389, at *1.
95 Id. at *3.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at *2.
99 Id.
100 See supra note 14.
101 Hotmail, 1998 WL 388389, at *2.
102 Id. at *7.
103 Id.
104 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1).
105 Hotnail, 1998 WL 388389, at *4.
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IMSo6 instead sought damages against a marketing company for
unauthorized e-mail advertising. 10 7 Yet, analogous to CompuServe
and Hotmail, the claim was primarily based on IMS's tortious
trespass to personal property, and its violation of the Lanham
Trademark Act.!08 The court found IMS liable for trespass to
chattels and explained that defendant's contact was actionable not
only because its bulk solicitations diminished the value of
plaintiff's possessory interest in its computer network, but also that
it "injured AOL's business good will."'" 9 Although the loss of
good will damages were not easily quantifiable, the court cited the
more than 50,000 subscriber complaints in only ten months,
defendant's spamming, and the increased subscriber cancellation
rate since IMS began its mailings."0 The court deferred ruling on
damages, however, until the issuance AOL's offer of proof and
IMS's opportunity to object."' The court also found that IMS
violated the Lanham Act by sending over sixty million e-mail
advertisements and falsely designating their origin as being sent
from "aol.com" addresses.
III. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Similar to the legislation proposed and passed by Representative
Miller in California,"' the Can Spam Act of 1999 attempts to deal
with unsolicited commercial e-mail in three distinct ways: 1) It
106 24 F. Supp.2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998).
107 Id. at 549.
108 Id. citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125 which states that "any person who, on or in
connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in
commerce any word, term name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof,
or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact...
which: (a) is likely to cause confusion or mistake, or deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, . . . origin, sponsorship, or approval of his goods, services or
commercial activities ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such an act.
109 Id. at 550.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 552.
112 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45 (enacted by Chapter 863).
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gives intermet service providers (ISPs) a right of action against any
spammer who violates the ISP's unsolicited commercial e-mail
policy; 2) it allows service providers to post their policy against
UCE on the web or on the server itself; and 3) it creates criminal
penalties for the unauthorized use of domain names in sending
spam. 1
3
First, the statutory creation of a cause of action against
spanmers gives ISPs the ability to self-regulate their medium. A
statutory cause of action allows for the award of actual monetary
loss suffered by the provider as a result of spamming, a fifty dollar
fine for each message that violates the ISP's policy against spam. 14
This award is limited to $25,000 per day."' In the event of
particularly egregious behavior by junk e-mailers, the bill warrants
the granting of injunctive relief as well as attorney's fees for the
prevailing party."6
Second, the bill proposes that service providers be allowed to
post their UCE policy not only on their World Wide Website, but
also on the initial banner message that accompanies their mail
server." 7 This banner message is transmitted automatically upon
connection to the addressee's service provider for all e-mail
messages."' As proposed, this banner would also notify the
purported spammer of the ISP's policy against spam, and offer an
option to terminate the connection or to continue delivery.119 The
banner notification would simply state a textual message of "NO
UCE" or give a specific definition by stating "UCE POLICY AT
[service provider's name].' ' 0
Third, the bill proposes criminal penalties for the unauthorized
use of domain names. If the spam sender uses a return address
other than his/her own and that message causes damage to a
computer, computer system, or computer network, the penalty
113 H.R. 2162, 106th Cong. (1999).
114 H.R. 2162 at § 2(c)(2)(B).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at § 2(d)(4)(C)(iii).
118 Id.
119 H.R. 2162 at § 2(d)(4)(C).
120 Id.
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would be up to one year in prison.121 The damage caused could
range from transmittal of a computer virus to the "crashing" of a
network due to bandwidth overload.
22
A contemporary bill to Miller's Can Spam Act presently in
Congress is the Inbox Privacy Act of 1999.123 This bill is
sponsored by Senators Toricelli and Murkowski and is a
combination and modification of two former bills suggested by
them in the 105fh Congress that failed to pass.12 1 Among other
requirements, the present bill: 1) demands that valid retum
addresses be included in all unsolicited e-mail messages; 2)
prohibits forgery of headers; 3) requires senders to comply with
opt-out requests; 4) allows domain name owners to publish opt-out
lists that apply to all addresses under the domain name; 5) requires
domain owners and ISPs to register their preferences with the
Federal Trade Commission; and 6) requires ISPs to maintain opt-
out lists to block spam, but prohibits ISPs from charging additional
fees for said service.
125
121 H.R. 2162 at § 3(b)(4)(B).
122 Pacific Bell Suffers Slowdown, C-Net News (March 13, 1998)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,20046,00.html>.
123 759, 106th Cong. (1999); See also H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. (1999) As
recently proposed by Rep. Wilson, with the short title "Unsolicited Electronic E-
Mail Act of 1999. Along with making extensive findings based on public
policy, the Wilson Bill suggests the creation of opt-out lists maintained by the
Federal Communications Commission and requirements for valid return
addresses. Violation of any provision would allow for orders from the FCC or
the local district court to cease and desist transmission. The Wilson Bill also
creates private rights of action by ISPs or Internet subscribers punishable by
injunctions and or monetary awards of $500 per violation, limited to $25,000
per day.
124 Senator Toricelli originally sponsored the "Electronic Mailbox
Protection Act of 1997," S 875, 105th Cong. (1997), which would have required
any and all senders of unsolicited e-mail to use valid return addresses and
comply both with recipient requests to opt-out and Internet standards. Senator
Murkowski's "Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Choice Act of 1997,"
H.R. 771, 105th Cong. (1997), would have required an "advertisement" label on
every UCE, required the sender's real name, street address, e-mail address and
phone number, and mandated ISP's to block out any and all incoming
advertisements upon request.
125 759 106th Cong. (1999).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Although private and self-regulatory initiatives are preferred
over legislative or judicial intrusion on the Internet, it has become
increasingly obvious that service providers and Internet subscribers
alone cannot stem the rising tide of junk e-mail. Contrary to past
and present proposed federal legislation, the Can Spam Act
survives both constitutional and legislative scrutiny by placing full
discretion in the hands of Internet Service Providers, establishing
strict civil and criminal penalties for violating posted policies and
using SMTP banner messaging. 26
A. Central Hudson Test
In order to pass constitutional muster, a restriction on
commercial speech such as unsolicited e-mail must satisfy the
Central Hudson test.' As stated by the Supreme Court, the test
requires that where commercial speech is neither misleading nor
promoting illegal activity, regulation is allowed if: (a) there is a
substantial government interest at stake, (b) the restriction directly
advances that interest, and (c) the restriction is narrowly tailored. 2 '
Moreover, the restriction need not employ the "least restrictive
means" to accomplish its ends; the regulation must be narrow
enough to have a "reasonable fit" between ends and means.'29 First,
the primary interest at stake for the government is to curtail the
cost-shifting from spanmers to ISPs and ultimately to Internet
subscribers as a whole, as well as to protect service providers'
126 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. Matisse's Glossary of Internet Terms
(visited Oct. 20, 1999) <http://www.matisse.net/files/glossary.html>.
127 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
128 Id. at 100 (finding that although a ban on all promotional advertising by
electric utility directly served the substantial state interest in energy
conservation, the Supreme Court invalidated the restriction because it was not
sufficiently narrow).
129 Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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rights to permit or restrict access to their proprietary equipment. 130
Second, the proposed restriction directly advances these interests
by allowing ISPs, who are most affected by and most able to
curtail spammers free-riding, to exercise full discretion in
employing preventive measures. Finally, the Miller Bill is
narrowly tailored enough to satisfy the third prong of the Central
Hudson test. Unlike other congressional propositions which
attempt to blindly filter all e-mail, the Can Spam Act focuses on
solicitors who operated under forged domain names, and those
who intentionally disregard service providers' policies against
unsolicited commercial e-mail. Ultimately, the Miller Bill does
not serve as a blanket restriction on the transmission of all e-mail,
or even commercial e-mail, but instead focuses directly on
fraudulent and unauthorized spain.
B. SMTP Banner Notification
The Can Spam Act as initially proposed by the Coalition Against
Unsolicited Commercial E-mail (CAUCE), the Can Spain Act's
proposed use of SMTP banner messaging is the first found in
federal legislation.' As discussed above, the notification system
would employ the SMTP banners already used between sender and
recipient servers upon connection for e-mail transmission.'32 The
Miller Bill suggests that when a connection is established and the
recipient server transmits its initial greeting to the sender,
providing notification that it is ready to receive mail, the recipient
130 HR 2162 §2 (b); See generally, Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46
F.3d 54 (1995) (finding that a ban on unsolicited commercial faxes served a
substantial government interest in preventing the shift of advertising costs from
solicitor to consumer because the regulation applied to commercial solicitations
by any organization).
131 CA UCE's "SMTP Banner Notification Proposal' (visited Oct.16, 1999)
<http://www.cauce.org/proposal/index.html>.
132 Almost all e-mail servers employ SMTP as their main protocol. The
protocol simply consists of a set of rules for how programs that send and receive
mail should interact. Matisse's Glossary of Internet Terms at 14.
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server would also transmit its policy on unsolicited commercial e-
mail. 3
3
The simplicity of the proposed SMTP notification has several
advantages over other regulatory measures. 34  First, SMTP
messaging already exists on all servers for both outgoing and
incoming e-mail, and it is very easy for an ISP's mail system
administrator to configure and monitor. 35 Second, unlike other
bills, the system would take very little additional administrative
cost to implement. 36 For example, both the Electronic Mailbox
Protection Act and the Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail
Choice Act of the 105' Congress proposed the compilation and
maintenance of opt-out lists that could easily include millions of
subscribers.137 In contrast, the Can Spam Act only requires ISPs to
modify a simple system that is already in place. Furthermore,
organizations such as CAUCE provide free software to describe
the process of checking banner messages and the ease of surveying
and sorting mailing lists. 3 ' Third, a possible sender of UCE is
instantly notified of the specific policy of each server through
SMTP messaging.'39 This instantaneous notification is also
beneficial to legitimate advertisers since no extensive research is
necessary to uncover the specific policies of each ISP. 40 Fourth,
there is no need for the legislature to create more rules for spain
regulation than absolutely necessary in order to foreclose any
loopholes that spammers could exploit. Because SMTP banners
operate on their own well-defined and efficient protocol, the
legislature need only defer to the service providers' identification
procedures. 4' Finally, SMTP messaging suggested in the Miller
133 H.R. 2162 §2(d)(4)(C)(ii).
134 CA UCE 2.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Johnathan Byme, Squeezing the Spain Off the Net: Federal Regulation
of Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 2 W. VA J.L. & TECH. 4 (1998).
138 CAUCE's Banner Notification Proposal at 3.
139 Id. at 2.
140 Id,
141 Id.
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Bill has the distinct advantage of having passed and operated
extremely effectively in California as a state statute. 42
Although banner notification has numerous advantages to other
suggested programs, some minor hindrances do exist. The greatest
inconvenience is that banner messaging requires all prospective
advertisers to check the policy of every server it uses before
contemplating transmission. 143 Another drawback is that delayed
transmission could result in unintentional violations by senders of
ISPs' spare policies, subjecting a well-meaning e-mail advertiser to
fines of $500 per message."
C. Improvements on Prior Legislation
The Can Spain Act also improves on former legislation that has
failed in Congress, specifically the Netizen's Protection Act of
1997.14 First, the Can Spare Act seeks to be a regulatory, not a
prohibitive, measure. Unlike the Netizen's Protection Act, which
sought to completely ban the transmission of all unsolicited
commercial e-mail, the Miller Bill focuses on fraudulent and
intentional abusers of e-mail systems. Second, the Miller Bill
retains the valid return address and identification requirements, but
unlike the Netizen's Act, makes their disregard criminally
actionable, limited to one year of imprisonment. 146 Third, the Can
Spam Act establishes stricter civil sanctions than prior proposed
142 Id.
143 Id. at 3.
144 Id.
145 H.R. 1748, 105th Con. (1997). The Act sought to extend the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to include e-mail. The Bill would have made
it unlawful for anyone to send an unsolicited advertisement to an e-mail address
of a person with whom the sender: 1) lacked a preexisting and ongoing business
or personal relationship, unless the individual provided express invitation or
permission; or 2) unless the sender clearly provided, at the beginning of the
advertisement the date and time of the message, the identity of the business,
entity or individual sending the message, and the sender's return e-mail address.
Bill Summary and Status for the 105th Congress (visited Oct.2, 1999)
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:HRO1748:@@@L>.
146 H.R. 2162 § 3.
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legislation. Pursuant to the junk fax law discussed above, the
Netizen's Protection Act allowed for a recovery of $500 per
violation, with treble damages for intentional misconduct.147
Comparatively, the Can Spam Act also allows for damage awards
based on each item of junk e-mail, at a lower "per message" fine
of fifty dollars, yet places a large daily limit of $25,000 per
sender.'48 By merely imposing a fine of fifty dollars per use of an
ISP's equipment, the Miller Bill takes into account that the cost per
transmission to the recipient is lower than that of a facsimile or
telephone call, and therefore the fine should not be as great. Yet,
the Bill attempts not to merely be viewed by spanmers as a cost of
doing business thereby setting a significant ceiling of $25,000 per
day.
D. Problems with the Inbox Privacy Act
A contemporaneous proposition in Congress to the Can Spam
Act is the Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, co-sponsored by Senators
Murkowski and Toricelli. Although this Bill is an improvement on
prior legislation, several shortcomings still exist. First, the Bill
takes discretionary power away from service providers and
legislatively dictates how spam is treated.'49  As with any
regulation, extensive congressional intervention raises
constitutional issues and creates problems with compliance.
Second, the Bill creates a loophole for "one-time" and "first-time"
unsolicited advertisements. 50 Under this Bill, there would still be
a myriad of spammers with access to all Internet subscribers
addresses, irrespective of ISP policies. These small-time
spammers would be immune from liability as long as they only
send the exact same e-mail solicitation once. Third, as previously
discussed, even though the implementation and maintenance of
147 See supra text and accompanying note 54.
148 H.R. 2162 § 2(c)(2)(B)(i).
149 S. 759 § 2(b), (c), (d).
150 See, Id.at (d)(2) Although the Toricelli Bill allows for "remove" options
on all unsolicited commercial e-mail, recipients can request to be removed from
future advertising only after the spammer has reached his intended target.
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opt-out lists has improved, the incentive to seasonably maintain
such a list presently does not exist.'
Although the use of the Federal Trade Commission to maintain
and match such lists of each service provider's UCE policy and e-
mail address domain names is admirable, in reality it would be
exceedingly confusing. Arguably, merely compiling and
maintaining a list of people who simply use electronic messaging,
and with which service provider would be a Herculean task.
Supplementing such a changing list on an Internet web page with
individual ISP policies and their domain names as well as a list of
all persons who have elected to be kept off junk e-mailing lists
could easily include tens of millions. 52 Such a master list, even if
maintained by the Federal Trade Commission, would be too
confusing for prospective spammers to adequately comply.
Finally, the Toricelli Bill creates insurmountable problems for
ISPs, and how they operate. By prohibiting service providers from
collecting a fee for receiving unsolicited e-mail, no incentive exists
to change from their original policy to that proposed by the Bill.' s3
Essentially, by complying with the Inbox Privacy Act, ISPs would
relinquish too many rights in order to advantage their subscribers.
Although it intends to strictly control the transmission of spam by
establishing numerous procedural guidelines for subscribers, ISP's,
government agencies, and junk solicitors, the Inbox Privacy Act
would create more problems than it would solve. Service
providers who already have an efficient system for dealing with
spam would be forced to fully comply with a federally mandated
system that is less effective and much more confusing.
V. CONCLUSION
Although nearly all Internet Service Providers and e-mail users
agree there is a need for legislative action to deal with spam, the
correct form of such action is greatly disputed. It has become
151 See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
152 S. 759 § 4 (c)(1).
153 S. 759 § 2 (c)(3)(B).
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increasingly clear that self-help strategies such as anti-spain
software and hardware, filtering, listing, and simply deleting have
had little to no effect on the torrential proliferation of unsolicited
commercial e-mail. Furthermore, based on numerous state
initiatives to regulate spare, the need for universal federal
legislation has shown itself to be overwhelming. Although
individual state statutes have been mildly successful, they fail to
completely deal with unsolicited commercial e-mail because of the
inherent ubiquity of the Internet. Since the approaches,
prohibitions and penalties vary greatly from state to state, service
providers and suspected spammers can be regularly confused as to
which law applies to whom and where. A simple solution to this
problem is passage of one federal law that clearly outlines
prohibited conduct and possible penalties therefor.
Passage of the Can Spain Act would be advantageous to all
parties involved because it would place full control in the hands of
service providers, who are the best equipped to combat spammers.
The Act also cleverly allows for all parties affected by unsolicited
commercial e-mail a cause of action as well as numerous choices
of remedies. Also, by incorporating an SMTP banner messaging
system, the Miller Bill employs an existing system of notification,
while creating a novel and effective way to notify prospective junk
e-mailers of UCE policies and penalties for violating them. The
genius of banner messaging and the Can Spare Act can be found in
its simplicity. The system does not incorporate large federal
agencies or voluminous lists, but simply adheres to the theory of
"caveat vendor."
Vasilios Toliopoulos
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